Vom deutsch-französischen Motor zu einem germano-französischen “Kondominium” über die EU

in English en Français in Italiano

Eine kurze Chronik zur Entstehung von Vichy-Europa

Vox Europ, 20. April 2022 The Lithuania Tribune, April 5, 2022

Nach den ruhmreichen Zeiten der deutsch-französischen Freundschaft unter Giscard und Schmidt und ihrer bereits etwas zweifelhafteren Wiederauflage unter Kohl und Mitterrand – letzterer eher durch die Ereignisse getrieben – kam der Motor zum Stehen. Die Vereinbarung zwischen Schröder und Chirac über die Deckelung der Agrarausgaben im Oktober 2022 ist das erste öffentliche Anzeichen dafür. Doch die Vorzeichen für diese deutsche Kehrtwende, diesen Übergang zur preußischen Zeit, diese Niederlage der Befürworter eines europäischen Deutschlands hatten sich im Laufe des vorausgegangenen Jahrzehnts gehäuft. Präsident Mitterrand liess die Frage von Bundeskanzler Kohl nach einer möglichen Vergemeinschaftung der französischen nuklearen Abschreckung unbeantwortet. 1994 reagierte die französische Politik nicht auf den Vorschlag der beiden CDU-Leitfiguren Wolfgang Schäuble und Karl Lamers, ein „Kerneuropa“ zu schaffen. Im Jahr 2000 schwieg Frankreich beharrlich zum Vorschlag des deutschen Außenministers Joschka Fischer, einen europäischen Bundesstaat zu gründen, obwohl dieser Vorschlag im Januar 2001 von Bundeskanzler Schröder öffentlich unterstützt wurde. Lire la suite

From Franco-German motor to German-French condominium over the EU

auf Deutsch en Français in Italiano

A brief chronicle of the European Union’s Pétainisation

The Lithuania Tribune, April 5, 2022, Vox Europ, April 20, 2022

After the glory days of the Franco-German couple under Giscard and Schmidt and, in a more ambiguous mode, under Kohl-Mitterrand – this time driven by events more than by any real ambition – the motor stopped. The Schroeder-Chirac agreement in October 2002 on capping the EU’s agricultural budget was the first public manifestation of this. But the signs of this German U-turn – of this shift to Prussian time, of this defeat for the champions of a European Germany – had accumulated over the previous decade. President Mitterrand had not responded to Chancellor Kohl’s enquiries about a possible mutualisation of the French nuclear deterrent. In 1994, the French political establishment had not been responsive to the idea of a “European hard core”, a proposal made by two key figures of the CDU, Wolfgang Schäuble and Karl Lamers. In 2000, France remained silent in the face of German foreign minister Joschka Fischer’s proposal for a European federation, a proposition publicly supported by Chancellor Schroeder in January 2001. Lire la suite

Ukraine and the Dutch shopkeeper

en Français in Italiano

The Lithuania Tribune, March 15, 2022

Olivier Dupuis and Carmelo Palma

NATO’s Ukraine policy – which combines strong political support, substantial military logistical support and strategic restraint – is certainly not perfect. It is surprising, for example, that the Atlantic organisation did not anticipate events, by providing anti-missile and anti-aircraft defence systems to Ukraine in good time. It was clear that the resounding failure of the Russian president’s “special operation” would inevitably lead him to opt for a strategy of terror, to “Chechenise” the war by targeting civilians and creating millions of refugees – not least in order to destabilise the whole of Europe and increase the costs of its solidarity with Ukraine. Nevertheless, the resilience of NATO and its remarkable unity proved wrong the hasty judgment that it was brain-dead. NATO is alive and its brain is too. Lire la suite

Ukraine: Nato can wait, not the EU

en Français in Italiano

Ukraine’s EU accession process is key to security negotiations with Russia

The Lithuania Tribune, March 2, 2022

by Olivier Dupuis and Carmelo Palma

A very bad idea is making the rounds. The idea is conveyed by the ambiguous statements of the High Representative for the Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, Josep Borrell. The idea, in substance, is that the EU’s 27 member states would give up negotiations on Kyiv’s accession to the Union in exchange for an end to the war and Russia’s withdrawal from Ukraine.

It is not that we should be averse to thinking about possible means of saving the face of the Kremlin arsonist, if these might stop the bloodbath that he has provoked. But one cannot pretend to believe that the process of Ukraine’s accession to the Union – process that would otherwise be open-ended and not concluded – might constitute a threat to Russia. Nor that the Russian president himself considers it more threatening than the EU’s heavy economic sanctions and the military assistance provided to Ukraine by the European countries. Lire la suite

Make Bruxelles Great Again

L’adesione dell’Ucraina all’Unione Europea è la più forte arma politica contro la guerra di Putin

Linkiesta, 1 Marzo 2022

Olivier Dupuis e Carmelo Palma

L’unità ritrovata è merito della resistenza di Kiev di fronte all’avanzata dei russi, che ha dato un segnale positivo agli altri Paesi. Il miglior modo per sostenere questa battaglia, che riguarda tutto il continente, è farla entrare nel club dei 27

How Putin made the EU great again. Domenica con questo titolo Politico ha salutato l’inatteso ritorno di un’Europa grande e unita grazie all’aggressione dell’Ucraina e agli azzardi di Putin, ricordando come, fino a poche settimane prima, nei principali Paesi europei, a partire dalla Germania, si mostrasse invece scetticismo verso gli “isterici” allarmi americani sull’imminente attacco a Kiev e si dichiarasse una totale indisponibilità a fornire armi agli ucraini, per resistere all’offensiva di Mosca. Lire la suite